Proposal of a Lunar Utilities Authority (LUA)
1. Concept Summary
In this paper, I propose the establishment of a Lunar Utilities Authority (LUA), a federally chartered government corporation that signs long-term, guaranteed offtake agreements with commercial suppliers of lunar utilities (including, but not limited to, power, water, regolith, propellants) and wholesales those utilities to NASA, the DoW, U.S. allies, and commercial entrants. Federally backing a utilities aggregator has a few unique advantages:
- Guaranteed offtake derisks capital formation for commercial lunar utility providers.
- A transparent purchase-price schedule provides a clear path to market for new entrants.
- Purchase models can incentivize speed-to-market, product quality, or other USG KPIs.
- By aggregating utilities, the USG has a hand in the standardization of lunar resources.
- LUA is a revenue-generating entity, similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and will thus not be indefinitely subject to national appropriation cycles.
2. Current Lunar Market Failure
The preconditions for a self-sustaining lunar market to form are currently absent. Five failures keep private capital out of lunar utility production, and none resolve on their own:
- No bankable demand. Lunar utility production is a first-of-a-kind, capital-intensive infrastructure with multi-decade payback horizons. The only near-term buyer is the U.S. government, purchasing through short-duration, mission-specific contracts. With no creditworthy, long-term offtake, a producer cannot underwrite its capex, and private capital struggles to finance commercial entrants.
- Chicken-and-egg. Lunar utilities are worth little in isolation. A propellant depot has no value without power and water feedstock; a water plant has no value without power to run it and a buyer for its oxygen and hydrogen. Each producer's return depends on the others' existing first, so everyone waits. Thus, the market settles into a low-investment equilibrium that only a central coordinator can break.
- The one-buyer problem. Even where the government is willing to buy, its demand is limited by annual appropriations. NASA cannot sign a twenty-year purchase agreement that Congress must re-fund every cycle, so the single largest source of demand is structurally incapable of offering the commitment that capital formation requires.
- Absent price signals. There is no reference price for a kWh of energy, a kg of water, or a unit of refined regolith on the lunar surface. Price information is a public good: once discovered, it benefits everyone, and without it, neither producers nor downstream users can model returns or size capacity.
- Lack of standardization. Absent common specifications (propellant purity, power interfaces, regolith grades, fluid couplings), every producer-customer pair must negotiate interfaces, fragmenting an already small market.
Most lunar infrastructure is naturally monopolistic (surface power, storage, etc.), and a secure domestic and allied supply chain carries strategic value. LUA exists to supply the missing demand, coordination, price signal, and standards that no private entrant can do alone.
3. Market-Shaping Mechanism
LUA will establish a range of products that it buys from commercial suppliers at predetermined technical specifications, allowing the USG to both set product standards and become the point of contact for core resources on the lunar surface. A table below shows example utility products that LUA can potentially trade:
| Utility | Potential Provider(s) |
|---|---|
| Power | Fission Surface Power (FSP) primes, Reflect Orbital, etc. |
| Water and Derivative Products (H2, O2, propellant) | Argo Space, Lunar Outpost, etc. |
| Regolith and ISRU | Interlune, Lunar Outpost, Redwire, etc. |
These products will be stored and handled by the commercial provider, but owned by LUA, and sold to customers like NASA, the DoW, allies, and commercial entities. As a revenue-generating entity, LUA will not be held down by appropriation cycles; like the Tennessee Valley Authority, it can be chartered as a self-financing government corporation that funds its commitments through resale revenue and (potentially) bond authority rather than annual appropriations (detailed further in Section 4). This gives credibility to the offtake guarantees – a purchase commitment Congress could defund each year is less likely to draw private growth capital.
Additionally, as the prime entity purchasing commercial output, there are a few ways for LUA to shape the market and encourage competition among commercial suppliers:
- Advance commitments. Multi-year volume guarantees with price ladders.
- Milestone payments. Bonus payments for the first delivery to spec per utility category.
- Prize ladders. Cost-reduction and reliability thresholds (e.g., $/kWh below benchmark, 99% uptime over 90 days, this will change by utility type).
- Dual-sourcing. Similar to NASA's approach of contracting multiple commercial entities to deliver on the same contract (CLPS, LTVS, CLD, etc.), LUA will encourage and accept utilities from multiple providers to avoid supply chain risk.
4. Structure
Institutional form. LUA should be chartered by its own act as a wholly government-owned corporation, not an office inside a department; its mission spans NASA, the DoW, Commerce, and DOE, and no single one should capture it. It operates like the Defense Logistics Agency (contract, warehouse, distribute standardized goods; DLA-Energy already does this for cryogens and propellant on Earth) but is financed like TVA: self-sustaining through resale revenue and bond authority, with transparent pricing, thus correcting DLA's two weaknesses, appropriation dependence and opaque pricing. LUA is seeded with an initial appropriation, then granted authority to retain resale revenue and potentially even issue bonds against it – this was TVA's same path: appropriations (1933) to bond-financed (1959) to zero federal funding (1999).
Governance. A board, presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed, with seats for NASA, the DoW, Commerce, and DOE, coordinated through the National Space Council. NASA and the DoW are anchor customers, preserving neutrality across buyers.
Complementary programs. LUA is the demand-and-standards layer for infrastructure already being built. Earlier this year, NASA cancelled Gateway in favor of an expanded moon base, whose second phase builds permanent infrastructure, including a power grid – exactly when utilities become operational necessities. It interoperates with CLPS, HLS, and LTV rather than replacing them; the Artemis Accords frame allied participation, and China's Russia-backed ILRS targeting the same south-pole region sharpens the national-security case.
Startup and timeline. Standup proceeds in phases: authorization (Yr 0–1), first offtake agreements timed to CLPS-era demos (Yr 1–5), scale-up and the shift away from appropriations to bonds (Yr 5–10), and mature self-financing (Yr 10+). Initial capitalization in the low single-digit billions; development is meant to align with NASA's Moon Base.
5. Precedents
Why do I believe this to be achievable? Because every operational component of LUA has precedent in how the United States has stood up emerging and strategic industries. The examples below each prove out a different piece of the design.
Tennessee Valley Authority. The financing template. A government corporation capitalized by appropriations that became self-sustaining through revenue and bond authority, fully off federal funding by 1999, and now profitable ($1.4B net income on $13.7B revenue, FY2025).
USDA Commodity Credit Corporation. The legal-financial template. A 1933 federal corporation that stabilizes agricultural markets through price-floor offtake: guaranteed purchases and nonrecourse loans backed by standing Treasury borrowing authority.
Defense Logistics Agency. The operating guideline. A single agency that contracts for, warehouses, and distributes standardized goods for DoW customers, with DLA-Energy – like LUA – handling cryogens and propellant. Proves the aggregation-and-distribution model, and its appropriations dependence and opaque pricing are exactly the flaws LUA can improve upon.
Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The strategic-custody precedent. A federal facility (est. 1975) that buys, stores, and releases a strategic commodity for supply security. Validates LUA's national-security rationale, even though its purpose is buffering rather than bootstrapping.
Solar and wind PPAs. Market proof. Long-dated, fixed-price offtake agreements are what made utility-scale renewables bankable and built the clean-energy project-finance model since the mid-2000s. LUA is, in effect, a federal PPA counterparty for lunar utilities.
In each case, the pattern holds: a creditworthy public buyer absorbs the demand risk a new industry cannot bear alone, then steps back as the market matures.