The Rocket Shortage & Space's Coming of Age
Over the past five years, Falcon 9 made launch feel like a utility, something founders would budget for, book, and stop thinking about. For venture investors, that assumption was sufficient to underwrite billions of dollars in early-stage space tech opportunity. As the market is now realizing, launch is not a one-size-fits-all formula. Still, alpha stands to be captured in what feels like a time of uncertainty if we appropriately index the economics of launch, competitive landscape, customer motivators, and probable M&A dynamics. The effort below outlines my personal opinions on Falcon 9's winddown, the space economy's coming-of-age, and what comes next.
Launch is not one-size-fits-all
Most conversations about the future of launch begin and end with Starship's "sub-$200/kg" ambition. The reality of launch economics is far more convoluted. Different applications demand different orbits and altitudes (which in turn drives payload capacity and price): a national security EO constellation needs to constantly monitor its area of interest at lower altitudes for high camera resolution, early orbital data center modules will want dawn-dusk SSO for near-constant sunlight, and the list goes on. Nor can you reach any orbit from anywhere; rockets can't fly over populated land (yet), launch sites are sparse, sea launch adds logistical complexity and does not exist at scale, and geopolitics constrains who can fly from where.
Falcon 9 and Starship work exceptionally well for Starlink, but for most satellite operators, rideshare is a means to an end – so much so that an entire orbital transfer vehicle market emerged on top of it to carry payloads that "last mile". None of this is news to anyone who has spent time in the industry. The point, rather, is that the customer's core struggle is not access to orbit; it is control over it.
So we do need multiple launch platforms?
Yes. Dedicated launch remains essential for government customers flying classified missions (think an EO satellite tasked over the Strait of Hormuz), for missions where responsiveness outweighs cost per kilogram, and for commercial customers who want guaranteed orbital access on a specific timeline – the market Peter Beck and Rocket Lab built Electron to serve.
However, every vehicle that was supposed to compete with Falcon 9 has stumbled in step. Vulcan was paused from national security missions in February, New Glenn exploded on the pad in May, and Neutron slipped into 2027 alongside Stoke, fresh off a $1B Series E. Put concretely: every challenger medium-lift vehicle is a NET 2027 story. Nevertheless, Falcon 9 is still flying, and I believe this new supply tranche will be ready to fill the gap by the time Falcon 9 fully winds down at the end of the decade.
Relief, however, does not mean survival. Of the 216 small-launch programs in Erik Kulu's 2025 survey, 17 are operational, and only one – Rocket Lab – is profitable on launch.
Then who will survive?
It is tempting (and easy) to cast defense as the market's savior. The Space Force tripled its NSSL Lane 1 ceiling to $17B, and a Lane 2 mission costs roughly $254M against $74M for a commercial Falcon 9. That ~3.4x premium is set by the requirements of assured access, not by the economics of the satellites being launched; no constellation closes at $254M a mission. I believe this is the most underappreciated fact about publicly traded launch companies: defense revenue is lumpy, appropriation-dependent, and detached from the commercial demand that public market investors will ultimately reward.
Instead, I believe winners will be selected on (1) reliability and (2) cadence. Commercial customers pay a premium for confidence – one anomaly can wipe out a year of flights, and for a startup navigating the private markets, a single lost launch can kill the company. Cadence follows because launch is a fixed-cost business: a rocket flown five times a year carries five times the overhead per flight of one flown twenty-five times. It is reasonable that Uncle Sam will keep a #2 and #3 heavy launch platform alive for assured access, which is why Blue Origin has survived on captive Amazon and national security demand despite weak cadence.
Where's the alpha?
The gap I find most exciting is medium lift, roughly 5–15 t to LEO, serving (1) single operators deploying several satellites to one plane, (2) large payloads bound for dedicated orbits or cislunar space, and (3) rideshare that the customer, not the launcher, controls. The first group is where demand is most visibly unmet; companies like AST SpaceMobile, Starcloud, and K2 Space either buy from the parent of a constellation they compete with or wait in line behind it. Brokers like SEOPS are now buying entire Falcon 9s to resell, and Neutron is booked through the end of the decade without having done its first flight! In my conversations with founders and fellow investors, Series A+ companies without launch certainty are increasingly treated as uninvestable.
I would not, however, expect rocket companies to merge with one another. Vehicles share little in engines, tooling, or process, so a launcher-on-launcher deal buys integration pain and little else. Consolidation will instead run down the stack. Rocket Lab is the closest thing to a template: Electron was the wedge, space systems now drive roughly three-quarters of its revenue, and it is acquiring Iridium for ~$8B. SpaceX is the same model at scale, with Starlink accounting for 61% of revenue in its S-1. Captive payloads remove demand risk and smooth out A&D budget cycles; on the other hand, independent pure-play launchers are the most likely to fail, in my opinion. Virgin Orbit, Vector, and ABL's launch business fell mostly to demand and capital structure, not rocket engineering.
The 2021 SPAC wave taught investors that launch-only balance sheets do not survive a demand headwind, and new US launch money has since narrowed to a handful of very large checks. Europe, meanwhile, has funded several vehicles through its Launcher Challenge; I expect the market will sustain only one, most likely a German company, given the depth of Berlin's backing and (price-insensitive) defense priorities.
Starship
Then there is Starship, whose first outside customer is a lab riding inside a return capsule in 2028; it still has no customers built around its Pez-dispenser fairing, and has not indicated if commercial fairings will be an option. If and when it opens to commercial rideshare – which I expect in the mid 2030s – I believe the market will diverge, much like taking the public bus versus calling an Uber Black. The bus is cheap, and it goes roughly where you need to go, but on its own, sometimes unpredictable, schedule. The Uber Black costs several times more, but it leaves when you do and drops you at the door.
| Public Bus (Starship rideshare) | Uber Black (dedicated launch) | |
|---|---|---|
| What customer buys | Mass to orbit at the lowest $/kg | A specific plane, fixed date, and slot |
| Who rides | In-space manufacturing, ODCs, etc. | Constellations, NatSec, etc. |
| Price sensitivity | High | Low |
| Schedule sensitivity | Low | High |
Orbital transfer vehicles may narrow the gap, but they do not close it; rideshare plus a last-mile tug suits the customer who cannot justify a dedicated launch but can pay a few hundred thousand dollars to reach their orbit – a real, but narrow, market.
Space's coming of age
For the last half-decade, the industry ran on one company's willingness to sell cheap capacity to anyone who asked, and investors underwrote accordingly. That era is now ending, excitingly, because the market grew large enough to need more than one answer. What replaces it is a tiered market, priced on what customers actually value: cost, control, or certainty. Far more similar to the global logistics market on Earth, and a concrete signal that space is here to stay.